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IN THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 17661

DONALD L. MALMROSE,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an appeal from the Honorable Calvin Gould's
denial of appellant's motion for a new trial.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Appellant was convicted by a jury of forcible
sexual abuse.

He was sentenced to the Utah State Prison.

A motion for new trial was denied.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant requests this Court to reverse the
conviction and grant a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On April 16, 198'.J, Brooke Williams was sexually
assaulted while jogging on a running course at Weber
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State College.

She reported the assault to Weber State

police and gave a description of her assailant.

On

April 17, 1980, Mrs. Williams was shown a group of muq
shots in an attempt to identify her assailant.

From

these pictures she picked out four individuals she
thought resembled him.

(Suppression Hearing 9)

The

mug shots were returned to the Ogden City Police
Department without a record being kept.

(T 118)

On

July 1, 1980, the complaining witness was shown seven
drivers license photos which she mistakenly thouaht
contained the same four pictures as before.
narrowed these to two possible suspects.
Hearing lJ)

She

(Suppression

While reviewing this group of pictures,

Mrs. Williams was told by the police that none of the
men were "nice guys".

(Suppression Hearing 12, 31)

requested a recent photograph of one of these men

She
~nd

the next day the police showed her a Mound Fort Junior
High school yearbook open to a page where the defendant
was pictured alone with the basketball team.

(T 8 3, 84)

After looking at the yearbook photograph, she was
informed that defendant had committed a sex offense in
California.

(Suppression Hearing 24)

An identification

was obtained.
On September 9, 1980, the cowplaining witness
picked the defendant out of a lineuo at the ?Olice
station and he was arrested.

The lineuo was eventually
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suppressed by Judge John F. Wahlquist because it was
conducted in violation of State statute.

(Suopression

Hearing 4 3)
The first photograph display did not contain a
picture of the defendant.

(T 166)

Throughout the

proceedings, Mrs. Williams maintained that she picked
out the defendant from"the first group of mug shots·
on April 17, 1980.

(Suppression Hearing 10)

The

police officers said she was not shown a picture of
the defendant until July 1, 1980.

(T 118)

Defendant's trial commenced February 9, 1981
on the charge of forcible sexual abuse, a third-degree
felony.

During the voir dire of the jury, prospective

juror Hunter made the following statements:
"I have a son who is a principal in an
elementary school.
It might be better
if I didn't listen to this." (T 11)
Speaking of her acquaintance with
George Handy, a State's witness, she
said:
"Hy acquaintance is casual.
I would believe what he said, yes".
(T 13)

When the Court asked her whether she
would subject George Handy to the same
scrutiny as other witnesses, her answer
was "probably". (T 14)
"I might be prejudice in this way, that
I think where schools are involved
there shouldn't be any question involved
about teacher propriety." (T 29)
When asked whether there was any reason
any of the jurors would not want to hear
the case, she said:
"I would prefer not
to". (T 31)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-3-

Prospective juror Widdison was asked whether
he had made up his mind based upon what he had read
in the newspaper.
sure it's bias".

He replied:
(T 29)

"Not totally.

When questioned further

about his ability to be fair, he only said:
believe I could".

I'm

"I

When asked if he would be inclined

to give a speedy decision because of his pending
vacation, he answered "probably".

(T 30)

The Court denied defendant's challenge for
cause on both of these jurors.

(T 33)

Defendant used

a peremptory challenge to eliminate prospective juror
Hunter.

(R 583)

the case.

Juror Widdison was selected to try

(R 583)

Other jurors selected to try the case gave
troublesome responses during the voir dire.

Juror Austin

said she has occasionally been assaulted by her husband,
and further indicated she might have problems with a
younger lady in a sexual assault case because of her own
family difficulties.

(T 26, 27, 31)

Juror Stockwell indicated his brother-in-law
was on the Highway Patrol and his daughter was attending
Weber State College.

(T 17)

Juror Wood lived in the same neighborhood and
attends the same church ward as prosecutor
Michael Glasmann.

When asked if it would make any

difference, he responded:

"I could probably assure
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them that it wouldn't".

(emphasis supplied)

(T 10)

The Court then suggested that defense counsel might
want to pursue this line of questioning;
counsel failed to do so.

Defense

Juror Wood also said he

knew James Gaskill, George Handy and Brian Stromberg
who were prospective State. witnesses.

None of these

potential problem areas were pursued by Court or
counsel.
Juror Poulter admitted to a hearing problem.
She said she could hear the prosecutor, but sometimes
9oulc;ln' t hear the others which apparently. included
the Court and defense counseL .. " (T 2 3)

When she was

asked by the Court if she had any immediate family in
police .. work, her response was:

"Yes, he has one

daughter teaching here -- well, here in Ogden .. (T 19)
It was apparent from the response that she did not
hear the Judg19' s ,question.

Jurors. Stockwell, . Wood

and Poulter were all selected to try the case.

(R 583)

After the jury.was selected, the Court read
instructions 1 through 10 which included the
instructions on the presumption of innocence and
credibility of witnesses.

(T 35, 506)

These

instructions were not given again at the conclusion
of the three-day trial.
During defense counsel's opening statement,
he said:
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"I would just like to bring out that the
only reason that Mr. Malmrose is before
you is through a series of coincidences.
A coincidence where his car was parked
allowed the police to take his license
number. The license number in turn was
pulled because his car was parked in an
area where they had some problems with
men exposing themselves." (T 44)
Evidence was not introduced to support this allegation.
During the trial, James Gaskill testified about
conducting certain laboratory tests.

The substance of

the testimony was that the blood type obtained from
defendant's saliva sample matched the blood type in
the assailant's semen found on the body of the
complaining witness.

Also, both specimens contained

the H antigen which shows they are secretors.

His

written report was offered and admitted into evidence.
(T 150)
Dr. David Dodd, a Ph.D. psychologist, preferred
expert testimony on behalf of defendant on the many
problems and misconceptions involved in evaluating the
accuracy of eyewitness identifications.

Dr. Dodd

maintained that education, special training, and
intelligence are not meaningful factors in assessing
the accuracy of such an identification.

The prosecutor

went into great detail establishing the educational
background, special training and supposed high
intelligence of the complaining witness.

The purpose

of this testimony was to infer that she possessed a
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superior ability to perceive and accurately recall.
The Court refused to allow Dr. Dodd to testify to
the j ury .

(T l 7 0 )

Prior to the trial, defendant filed his Notice
of Alibi as required by statute.

The.State called

four rebuttal witnesses to defendant's alibi.

At

no time did the prosecutor file. a reciprocal Notice
of Alibi as required by statute.
During the cross-eximination of defendant, the ..
prosecutor asked:
"Do you recall·making the statement. to
them (the police), I'm a voyeur, but I
wouldn't assault anyone." (T 358)
A timely objection was made and the Court ruled in
defendant's favDr, but denied a request for a
cautionary instruction.
One

of~ the

Mark Eubank.

(T 363)

State's rebuttal. witnesses was

He testified concerning the weather on

April 16, 1980 which was brought into issue
the presentation of defendant's alibi.

duri~g

His entire

presentation was from the reports of_ other people in
the Ogden area.

This is mentioned because the defendant

argues herein that the presentation was hearsay.
Florence Stowe was initially called by the
defendant.

She testified that defendant was at work

at Mound Fort Junior High school on April 16, 1980,
and that she could remember the day because she had
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ordered some cream pies for a church meeting that
night and recorded this fact in a personal journal.
The prosecutor recalled Mrs. Stowe in rebuttal and
asked her to read the dates of the last two entries
in her journal which were March 30, 1980 and
April 26, 1980.

(T 471)

Mr. Glasmann asked no

further questions and created the imoression that
she was mistaken about the date in her earlier
testimony.

Mrs. Stowe's journal entry on

April 26, 1980 specifically referred to the date
of the church function as April 16, 1980.

(R 641)

The jury returned a verdict of guilty on
February 11, 1981 after three days of trial.
On February 25, 1981, the Court sentenced the
defendant to the Utah State Prison.

A motion for new

trial was timely filed by new counsel for the
defendant.

The motion was denied by the Court on

April 3, 1981.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
DEFENDANT WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
AS GUARANTEED BY THE SIXTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 12 OF THE
UTAH CONSTITUTION.
Many of the issues raised in this appeal were
not properly preserved by defense counsel at trial.

As subsequent matters are discussed in this Brief,
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that fact will be noted, but further authority will
not be cited except as set forth in this Point.
The Sixth Amendment of the United States
Constitution provides:
"In all
accused
to have
for his

criminal prosecutions, the
shall enjoy the right.
the assistance of counsel
defense."

Article I, Section 12 of the Utah State
Constitution similarly provides:
"In criminal prosecutions, the
ace.used· shall have the right to
appeal and def end in person and
by counsel.
"
As a general rule, a judgment o£. conviction
will not be invalidated because of inexperience or ·
unskillfulness on the part of defense counsel or
because of error in judgment on his part.
In Herring v.

Estelle~

491 F. 2d 125 (5th

Cir. 1974.), the Court held that the governing standard
should be "reasonably effective assistance" of counsel,
The. Sixth Circuit has ·adopted the following standard:
"The assistance of counsel required
under the Sixth.Amendment is counsel
reasonably likely to render effective
assistance." Beasley v. United States·,
491 F. 2d 687 (6th Cir. 1974)
In United States v. Bosch, 584 F. 2d 113 (1st
Cir. 1978), a narcotics trial, defense counsel
introduced into evidence a
..reduction of bail.

pre~trial

motion for

.The motion disclosed defendant's
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two other narcotics convictions.

It was offered

to prove that defendant had been in court on the
date it was filed; however, defense counsel did
not attempt to delete the reference to his client's
prior crimes.

During deliberation, the jury informed

the trial Judge that the fact of defendant's prior
convictions had influenced its opinion of his
character.

Counsel did not request a limiting

instruction or demand a mistrial.
convicted.

Defendant was

On appeal, the Bosch Court reversed and

adopted the "reasonably competent assistance
standard".

The Court held that the quality of

defense counsel's representations must be within
the range of competence expected of attorneys in
criminal cases.

The standard in Utah was adopted in

State v. McNichol, 554 P. 2d 203 (1976).
In footnote five of State v. Gray, 601 P. 2d
918 (1979), the Court stated:
"We do not mean· to be understood as
saying that a defendant can only succeed
in showing that he was deprived of
counsel by showing that his attorney's
failures reduced his trial to "a farce
or a mockery of justice". We agree with
the dissent that the standard should be
as stated in State v. McNichol.
that the righ~counsel "is not
satisfied by a sham or pretense" of an
attorney, but an accused is "entitled
to the assistance of a competent member
of the Bar who shows a willingness to
identify himself with the interests of
the accused and present such defenses as
are available."
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In State v. Smith, 621 P. 2d 697 (1980), this
Court considered whether the lack of fair assistance
of counsel could be treated as harmless error.

The

Court said:
"But the assistance of counsel is among
those constitutional rights so basic to
a fair trial that their infraction can
never be treated as harmless error."
At page 699.
It is submitted that the errors of defendant's
counsel at trial went beyond errors of judgment or
mistake of tactics and fell below the threshold of
competence expected of lawyers in criminal trials.
POINT TWO
DEFENDANT'S CHALLENGE FOR CAUSE OF JURORS HUNTER AND
WIDDISON SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUSTAINED.
During the jury voir dire, prospective jurors
Hunter and Widdison each expressed a state of mind
which indicated they could not act impartially if
selected.
Juror Hunter made the following statements:
"I have a son who is a principal in an
elementary school.
It might be better
if I didn't listen to this." (T 11)
Speaking of her acquaintance with
George Handy, a State's witness, she
said:
"My acquaintance is casual.
I would believe what he said, yes".
(T 13)

When the Court asked her whether she
would subject George Handy to the same
scrutiny as other witnesses, her answer
was "probably". (T 14)
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"I might be prejudice in this way, that
I think where schools are involved
there shouldn't be any question involved
about teacher propriety." (T 29)
When asked whether there was any reason
any of the jurors would not want to hear
the case, she said:
"I would prefer not
to". (T 31)
Juror Widdison was asked whether he had made
up his mind based upon what he had read in the
newspaper.
bias".

He replied:

(T 29)

"Not totally.

I'm sure it's

When questioned further about his

ability to be fair, Mr. Widdison only said:
believe I could".

"I

When asked if he would be inclined

to give a speedy decision because of his pending
vacation, he answered:

"probably".

(T 30)

It should

be noted that Mr. Widdison's vacation was scheduled
to start before the trial actually ended.

(T 24)

Defense counsel challenged both jurors for cause.
The Court denied the challenge.

(T 33)

Defendant used a

peremptory challenge to eliminate Mrs. Hunter.
Mr. Widdison was selected and tried the case.

(R 583)
(R 583)

Rule 19(14), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure,
allows a challenge for cause provided:
"[t]hat a state of mind exists on the
part of the juror with reference to
the cause, or to either party, which
will prevent him from acting impartially
and without prejudice to substantial
rights of the party challenging.
In State v. Brooks, 563 P. 2d 799 (1977), the
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Utah Supreme Court held it was an abuse of discretion
for the trial court to deny defense counsel challenge
for cause when the record indicated a relationship of
affection, respect, or esteem for some of the State's
witnesses.

The Court went on to say that even though

the potential jurors stated they would set aside these
relationships and decide the case without bias, it
would run counter to human nature not to believe those
personal associations would influence their decisions.
Jenkins v. Parrish, No. 15905, filed
March 13, 1981, considered the trial Court's refusal
to remove a juror for cause who indicated she would
give more weight to the testimony of a doctor simply
because he was a doctor.

Upon further questioning by

the Court, the juror conceded that if the doctor's
testimony was not in accord with the other evidence,
she would accept the other evidence.
In granting a new trial, the Utah Supreme Court
said:
"Although Mrs. Eddins expressed a desire
and ability to remain fair and impartial
once all the evidence was presented, her
statements do not alter the fact that she
indicated that her background would cause
her to place greater credence in a doctor's
testimony simply because of his status as a
doctor. A statement made by a juror that
she intends to be fair and impartial loses
much of its meaning in light of other
testimony and facts which suggest a bias."
It is submitted that jurors Hunter and Widdison
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indicated a state of mind that would prevent them
from acting impartially.

Despite what curative

questions might· have subsequently been asked by the
Court, it "would run counter to human nature"
(Brooks, supra) not to believe that their expressed
bias would influence their decision.
POINT THREE
THE ENTIRE JURY VOIR DIRE BY THE COURT AND DEFENSE
COUNSEL WAS INADEQUATE.
Many areas of potential bias and competency
were inadequately explored by the Court or counsel.
Juror Austin said that on occasion she had been assaulted by her husband, .,and further indicated
she might have problems with a younger lady in a
sexual assault case because of.her own family
difficulties.

(Ti26, 27, 31)

Juror Stockwell's brother-in-law was on the
Highway Patrol and his daughter was attending Weber
State College.

(T 17)

Juror Wood lived in the same neighborhood and
attends the same church ward as prosecutor
Michael Glasmann.

When asked if it would make any

difference, he responded:

"I would probably assure

them that it wouldn't"·, (emphasis supplied)

(T 10) ··

The CourL then suggested that defense counsel might'
want. to pursue this line of questioning.

Defense
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counsel failed to do so.

Juror Wood also said he

knew James Gaskill, George Handy and Brian Stromberg
who were prospective State witnesses.

There was no

follow-up concerning the nature of these
relationships.

(T 13)

Juror Poulter admitted to a hearing problem.
She said she could hear. .t.ha prosecutor, but sometimes
couldn't hear the others which apparently included
the Court and defense counsel.

(T 23)

This hearing

problem was made apparent when the Court asked her
if any of her immediate family were in police work.
Her answer was not at all responsive to this question
which shows she could not hear the proceedings.

(T 19)

Jurors Stockwell, Wood and Poulter were selected to
try the case.

(R 583)
POINT FOUR

UNNECESSARY PREJUDICIAL SUGGESTION ABOUT DEFENDANT
TOOK PLACE DURING DEFENSE COUNSEL'S OPENING STATEMENT.
During defense'counsel's opening statement,
he said:
"I would just like to bring out that the
only reason that Mr. Malmrose is before
you is through a series of coincidences.
A coincidence where his car was parked
allowed the police to take his license
number. The license number in turn was
pulled because his car was parked in an
area where they had some problems with
men exposing themselves."
Evidence was not introduced to support this statement.
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It is obvious the State could not have properly
introduced such evidence.

It's possible that it

might be considered a tactical error on part of
defense counsel, but it is difficult to see how this
statement could have assisted the defendant under
any circumstances.

On the other hand, it created

the risk that the jury would assume the defendant
had been involved in other sexual offenses on other
occasions because of his proximity to the scene of
unrelated crimes.

It would appear that this statement

falls within the same type of conduct by defense
counsel as mentioned in Point One, United States v.
Bosch, supra.
POINT FIVE
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DISALLOWING THE
TESTIMONY OF DAVID DODD.
The Court refused to allow the proferred expert
testimony of Dr. David Dodd, a Ph.D. psychologist on
the many problems and misconceptions involved in
evaluating the accuracy of eyewitness identifications.
Dr. Dodd maintained that education, special training,
and intelligence are not meaningful factors in
assessing the accuracy of such an identification.
(T 164)

In other words, these factors do not improve

a person's ability to perceive or recall an incident
although most laymen, including jurors, erroneously
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believe the reverse is true.

It should be noted

the complaining witness is a highly educated woman
with several advanced degrees including'a degree in
Police Science.

Judge John F. Wahlquist, at the

suppression hearing, made the following Finding of
Fact:
"It is necessary to recognize the
general character of this particular
crime. This particular crime victim,
from the standpoint of a prosecuting
witness, is almost ideal. She has a
master's degree in a related field
which would cause her to guard, to be
careful, and to be alert. She's at
her prime in life. She appears to be
in excellent health. Her vision appears
to be good at short distances. At the
time of her assault, there were no
distracting· forces .. such, as other third
parties. There was some striking, but
there was no evidence o.f. any
unconsciousness or anything of the
sort. There is every reason· to believe
that this is an above average intelligent
woman who has been carefully trained by
the fates of life to be what she is now,
and that is a crime victim witness:- This
is her status. The record also shows
that she has throughout.been considerably
cautious as far as identification is
concerned." (Suppression Hearing 41, 42)
In the recent case, State v. Griffin, No.
16669, filed February 20, 1981, the Utah Supreme
Court upheld the trial Court's refusal to allow
testimony of a psychologist as an expert witness to
testify about the credibility of eyewitness
identification.

In Griffin,,. this Court indicated

that the use of expert testimony on the merits· of

.. ,:,-
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eyewitness identification was within the discretion
of the trial court and that expert testimony would
not ordinarily be allowed in areas equally within
the knowledge of jurors.
If Judge Wahlquist believed that education,
special training, and intelligence enhanced one's
capacity to perceive and recall, then surely one or
more jurors could have shared his opinion.

The

purpose of Dr. Dodd's testimony was to rebut what
the defense maintained was a popularly held
misconception.

The defendant was prejudiced.

He

was denied the opportunity to completely present his
side of the case.

The prosecutor went into great

detail establishing the educational background,
special training, and supposed high intelligence of
the complaining witness.

The purpose of this testimony

was to infer that she possessed a superior ability to
perceive and accurately recall.

Would the prosecutor

have gone into such detail if the complaining witness
had been an uneducated fry cook at a local cafe?
It is submitted that proferred testimony of
Dr. Dodd was not within the ordinary intelligence of
the jurors and that the Court abused its discretion
by not allowing him to testify.

Expert opinion

testimony is admissible if it will aid the jury on a
factual issue in a case.

Expert Testimony on Eyewitness

Perception, 82 Dick. L. Rev. 465 (1978).
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While Griffin held that it is within the
discretion of the trial court to allow•this type of
expert testimony, it appears that Judge Gould
erroneously believed he did not have discretion
since there wasn't a Utah case at that time.

(T 170)

POINT SIX
THE IDENTIFICATIONS OF DEFENDANT BY THE COMPLAINING
WITNESS WERE TAINTED AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED.
On April 17, 1980j the day after the assault,
the complaining witness was shown a.group of mug shots
. in a,n attempt to identify her assailant. --··From these
pictures she picked out four individuals she thought
resembled him.
.,

(Suppression Hearing 9)

On July 1, 1980,

the c9mplaining :witness was shown seven drivers license
photos which she mistakenly thought -contained -•the same.
four pictures a& before which she narrowed down to two
possible suspects.

(Suppression Hearing 10)

Then she

requested a recent photograph of one of these men and
the next day, ..the police showed ·her a" Mound Fort Junior
High school yearbook open to a page where the defendant
was pictured alone with the basketball team.

(T 83, 84)

An identification was obtained.

On September 9, 1980, the complaining witness
picked the defendant out of a lineup•at the police
station.

The lineup was conducted in violation of

State statute.

Nevertheless, the earlier photographic
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lineups and the in-court identifications were held
admissible.

(Suppression Hearing 42-44)

Although the evidence is in conflict, it
appears the first photographic display did not
contain a picture of the defendant.

(T 116)

Throughout the proceedings, the complaining witness
maintained that she picked him out from the first
group of mug shots on April 17, 1980.

On the other

hand, the police officers say that the complaining
witness was not shown a picture of the defendant
until two or three months later.

(T 118)

The mug shots cannot be produced because they
were returned to the Ogden City Police Department
without a proper record being kept which is prejudicial
to defendant.

(T 118)

These pictures would have been

helpful in supporting defendant's contention of mistaken
identity.
In order to encourage the complaining witness
to make an identification, the police offered certain
unsolicited comments.

While reviewing the second group

of pictures, she was told none of the men were "nice
guys".

(Suppression Hearing 12, 31)

After looking at

the yearbook photograph, she was informed that
defendant had committed a sex offense in California.
(Suppression Hearing 24)

These comments by the police

officer were suggestive, irresponsible, and extremely
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prejudicial since their purpose was to assure the
complaining witness that even if she'"tnade a
misidentification, it would not create too much of
a miscarriage of justice because the men shown to
her were social degenerates anyway.
The yearbook photograph was unduly suggestive
since defendant was the only adult on the page·;.'· The
tainted identification process was bolstered by the"'•'
illegal lineup suppressed by Judge John F. Wahlquist.
Photographic iineups are to be afforded the
same due process protection as in-person lineups.
Simmons v. United States, 390

lY:s.

377 (1968).

The test is whether the pre-trial confrontation was
so unnecessarily sugge'stive and conducive to
irreparable mistaken identification that the
defendant was denied due process of law.
Stovall v. Denno, 338 U.S. 293 (1967).
The in-court identification of defendant by
the complaining witness was tainted by unconstitutional·
pre-trial confrontations.
States, 371

u.s.

471, the

In Wong Sun v. United

Court

··

said that evidence

to which an objection is made cannot come from
exploitation of prior illegality which is not purged
from the primary taint.
iden~ification

Where a flawed pre-trial •·

occurs, the State is not entitled to

use an in-court identification without showing it is

~

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-21-

not tainted by the prior identification.

Only a

per se exclusionary rule can be an effective sanction
to ensure that law enforcement authorities will
respect the defendant's due process rights during
pre-trial identification procedures.

See Gilbert v.

California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
In Neil v. Biggers, 34 L. Ed 2d 401 (1972),
the United States Supreme Court held that the
reliability of the identification procedure must
be considered under the "totality of the circumstances".
Those circumstances include "the opportunity of the
witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime,
the witness' degree of attention, the accuracy of the
witness' prior description of the criminal, the level
of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the
confrontation, and the length of time between the
crime and the confrontation", at 411.
Applying each of these factors in defendant's
case, the evidence is as follows:
A)

Opportunity to view the criminal.

Mrs. Williams claims the assailant was in front of
her for 7-1/2 to 8 minutes.
B)

(T 72)

Degree of attention.

Considering the

nature of the crime, this aspect could be questionable.
She claims she observed him closely, but admitted she
did not observe his eyes.

(T 97)
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C)

Accuracy of prior description.

Mrs. Williams gave an oral description to police
on the day of the asault as follows:

A white male

American approximately 45 to 50 years old,
approximately six foot four tall, thin.build, but
was muscular, had light to medium brown hair that
was graying, hair was slightly wavy and parted on the
right side.

The male has a ruddy complexion which

appears to be acne scars.

Has a distinctive line or

scar on the left side of his face.

No facial hair.

Facial features appear square with a medium to large
nose.

No glasses.

Suspect was wearing dark navy-blue

sweater shirt and navy-blue sweat pants.

Suspect has

a slight tan and his skin appears leathery.

(T 75)

She denied at trial that she told police his hair
was slightly wavy.

(T 76)

The next day she wrote out a description for
the police as follows:

Approximately 45 years old,

stood about six three or six four, had medium to light
brown hair with a great deal of gray running through
it, had straight hair that had body to it, parted on
the right side, a ruddy complexion with skin that
was leathery, tawnish, and marked with scars that
appeared to be the result of bad acne during
adolescent years, had a line on his face.

Appeared

to be outdoors a lot, lean and in good shape.

(T 77)
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At trial she admitted the defendant had no
acne scars.

(T g2)

He had no scar but had lines

on both sides of his face, not just the left side.
(T 92)

~

The defendant is only six foot one inch.

(T 365)

In judging his height for police, she had

compared her assailant to her husband's height which
is five foot eleven and a half inches.

(T 57)

If

that were correct, she shouldn't have been.so far
off on estimated height.

The defendant has never

had a part in his hair while teaching at Mound Fort.
(T

318)

He has never owned or been seen in a-navy-blue

sweat shirt or navy-blue sweat pants.
D)

(T 345, 309)

Level of certainty of witness.

Mrs. Williams claimed she was certain in her
,,identification of the defendant, but she was also
certain that the defendant's picture was among the
first group of mug shots shown to·-her on·April 17, 1980,
and the police admit she is wrong in that regard.
E)

Length of time between crime and

confrontation;

The crime occurred on April 16, 1980.

Mrs. Williams was first shown a picture of defendant
on July 1, 1980.

The first in-person meeting occurred

through a one-way glass window at the suppressed lineup
in September of. 1980.

All subsequent identification

from that point on were tainted by the prior
illegalities.
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It js submitted that the critical factors
in the totality of circumstances, i.e. the length
of t'ime before initial identification, the error
about defendant's mug shot, and mistakes in the
description, all point to an unreliable
identification.
The failure to keep records of the mug shots
shown to Mrs. Williams on April 17, 1980 was
extremely damaging to defendarrtr/.
"In short, the accused's inability
to effectively reconstruct at trial
any unfairness that occurred at
lineup may deprive him of his only
opportunity meaningfully to attack
the credibility of the witness'
courtroom identification." United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
Thus, even if the conduct of the pre-trial identification
is not so unnecessarily suggestive as to amount to a
denial of due process, the circumstances of the prior
identification are recognized by the Supreme Court as
constituting a potential source of material for
cross-examination.

In this case, all opportunities

for cross-examination were lost when the photographic
lineups were not properly preserved.
Where a law enforcement agency loses evidence
which may be material to the defendant's. case, the·
charges should be dismissed; United States v.
174 F. Supp 877 (1957).

~'

United States v.
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Consolidated Laundries Corp., 291 F. 2d 563 (2nd
Cir. 1961), involved missing evidence which might
have been of value in cross-examining a prosecution
witness.

The potential value of the evidence in

cross-eximination could not be estimated with
accuracy the Court reasoned.

Therefore, since it

was apparent that the evidence would have had at
least some such value, the Court found it to be
material to the defense and its negligent
suppression a violation of due process.

See also

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) by analogy.
POINT SEVEN
THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING INTO EVIDENCE A
WRITTEN LABORATORY REPORT BY JAMES GASKILL, WEBER
STATE COLLEGE CRIME LAB DIRECTOR.
James Gaskill testified about conducting
certain laboratory tests.

The substance of the

testimony was that the blood type obtained from
defendant's saliva sample matched the blood type
in the assailant's semen found on the body of the
complaining witness.

Also, both specimens contained

the H antigen which shows they are secretors.

His

written report was then offered and admitted into
evidence.

(T 15 0)

While the testimony only placed the defendant
within forty to forty-five percent of the world's
population,

(T 146), as an exhbit, the report
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created a continuing impression on the jury since
they could review it again and again during their
deliberations.

It was the only physical evidence

that had any circumstantial connection to the
defendant, no matter how slight.
It is clear from Rules 62 and 63 of the Rules
of Evidence that the. report is hearsay and .does not
fall within any of the recognized exceptions.
POINT EIGHT
THE STATE'S INTENTIONAL REFERENCE TO ALLEGED PRIOR
CRIMINAL MISCONDUCT BY THE DEFEND~.T AND_ THE -COURT'S
REFUSAL TO GIVE A CAUTIONARY- INSTRUCTION WAS -PREJUDICIAL ERROR.
During the cross-examination of the defendant-,
the prosecutor asked:
"Do you recall making the statement
to them (the police), I'm a voyeur,
but I wouldn't assault anyone." (T 358)

_,__

This is an impermissible comment on defendant's
character and was an obvious attempt to let the jury
know about defendant's past misdemeanor problems which
were clearly inadmissible..

There .was a timely

objection and the Court ruled in de£endant's favor,
but denied the request for a cautionary instruction.
(T 63)
In United States v. Diaz, 585 F. 2d 116
(5th Cir. 1978), the Court said:
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"The sole issue, therefore, is whether
the failure of the trial judge in this
case to give such an instruction, sua
sponte, is reversible error.
It does
not appear that this precise question
has been determined by this circuit.
Other circuits are divided on this.
See Nutt v. United States, 335 F. 2d
817 (10th Cir.), a cert. denied 379
U.S. 909, 85 S. Ct. 203, 13 L. Ed 2d
180 (1964) , holding that there was no
error when a limiting instruction was
not requested; contra, United States v.
Bobbitt, 146 U.S. App. D.C. 224, 450
F 2d 685 (D.C. Cir. 1971), holding
that the trial judge must act, sua
sponte, whether or not a request for
an instruction is made.
United
States v. Ailstock, 546 F. 2d 1285
(6th Cir. 1976); Evans v. Cowan, 506
F. 2d 1248 (6th Cir. 1974)~117.
They further stated:
"We recognize the salutary rule that
empowers the trial judge to exercise
discretion in determining what curative
instruction is required and hold only
that when, during a jury trial,
evidence is introduced that the
defendant has a prior conviction for
the same offense for which he is being
tried, both counsel and the court have
a duty to minimize the risk that the
jury would infer guilt on the cocaine
charges from the fact of previous
convictions on cocaine charges. Thus,
in this situation where no cautionary
instruction is given to the jury,
prejudicial error has intervened" at 118.
POINT NINE
THE STATE'S USE OF WITNESSES TO REBUT DEFENDANT'S
ALIBI WITHOUT WRITTEN NOTICE WAS IN VIOLATION OF
STATUTE.
In compliance with 77-14-2, Utah Code
Annotated, defense counsel submitted a list of all
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but one alibi witness which he decided to call after
his initial Notice of Alibi had been filed.

The

prosecutor did not provide notice of rebuttal
witnesses as required by that same statute.

Defense

counsel did not object, but it is cl€ar from the
record that the State's alibi rebuttal witnesses had
a devastating effect on defendant's case.
Most all of the alibi witnesses called by
defendant claimed to have seen him at Mound Fort
Junior High school at the time of the alleged attack.
Each of the witnesses recalled this day because there
had been a baseball game with another school.

They"

also recalled that there had been a slight rain
shower sometime during or just prior to the game.
All of the State's rebuttal witnesses, including
Mark Eubank,

~laimed

there was no rain on that day in

the area of Mound Fort Junior High.
In Judge Gould's Memorandum Decision denying
defendant's motion for a new trial, he claimed that
:L f this was an error, it was harmless· since defense

counsel had actual knowledge of these rebuttal
witnesses well before the trial commenced.

There is

nothing in the record to support this ·conclusion.
While some of these witnesses were introduced to the
prospective jury during voir dire, there is nothing
to indicate they were to be used as rebuttal witnesses
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«;.

or the nature of their testimony.
POINT TEN
THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING HEARSAY TESTIMONY FROM
STATE'S WITNESS, MARK EUBANK.
One of the most damaging witnesses to defendant
was Mark Eubank.

He testified about the weather on

April 16, 1980.

The entire presentation was hearsay.

None of the people he claimed observed the weather
testified in court.

Meaningful cross-examination

and confrontation was impossible.

Even though an

objection was not taken, the Court should have alerted
defendant's counsel at a bench conference or entered
an objection on its own.

To illustrate this point,

it should be noted that on another occasion the
Court entered its own objection to a leading question
posed by defense counsel without prior objection by the
State.

(T 234)

The Court should have afforded the same

courtesy to the defendant in this damaging area of
testimony.
In his Memorandum Decision denying defendant's
motion for new trial, Judge Gould stated that
Mark Eubank's testimony was founded upon regular
entires made in the course of business known as
"Weather Bank" and, therefore, admissible as an
exception to the hearsay rule.
Rule 63(13), Utah Rules of Evidence, states:
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"Writings offered as memoranda or
records of acts, conditions or events
to prove the facts stated therein, if
the judge finds that they were made
in the regular course of a business
at or about the time of the act,
condition or event recorded, and that
the sources of information from which
made and the method and circumstances
of their preparation were such as to
indicate their trustworthiness."
The substance of Mark Eubank's testimony came
from documents of weather conditions that were
prepared by other weather observers, not a part
of "Weather Bank", and sent to Mr. Eubank for his
own information.

Those documents were not made in

the regular course of his business.
Even if Mr. Eubank's testimony could have
fallen within the exception stated above, there was
absolutely no foundation to show that the exception,
in fact, applied.
POINT ELEVEN
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT OCCURRED IN TESTIMONY OF
FLORENCE STOWE WHEN CALLED AS A REBUTTAL WITNESS
BY THE STATE.
Florence Stowe was initially called by the
defendant.

She testified that defendant was at work

at Mound Fort Junior High school on April 16, 1980
and that she could remember the day because she had
ordered some cream pies for a church meeting that
night and recorded this fact in a personal journal.
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The prosecutor recalled Mrs. Stowe in rebuttal and
asked her to read the dates of the last two entries
in her journal which were March 30, 1980 and
April 26, 1980.

The prosecutor asked no further

questions and created the impression for the jury
that Mrs. Stowe was mistaken about the date in her
earlier testimony.

Defense counsel also failed to

ask any further questions.
Mrs. Stowe's Affidavit was filed with the
Court during the hearing on defendant's motion for
new trial.

(R 641)

Her journal entry on

April 26, 1980 specifically referred to the date of
the church function as April 16, 1980.

Mrs. Stowe's

Affidavit further states that the Weber County
Attorney's office had previously confirmed that the
church meeting in question was in fact held on
April 16, 1980.
In Walker v. State, 624 P. 2d 687 (1981),
the Utah Supreme Court· held that a false impression
knowingly fostered by the prosecutor could have
affected the judgment of the jury and the
prosecutorial misconduct deprived the defendant of
a fair trial.
It is submitted that this prosecutor also
intentionally created a false impression in the minds
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of the jury and thereby deprived defendant of
a fair trial.
POINT TWELVE
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY.
The errors referred to in this Point were
not preserved by defense counsel at trial.

Rule

19(c) of Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure states
that, not withstanding a parties failure to object,
error may be assigned to instructions in order to
avoid manifest injustice.
In United States v. Greene,

59~

F. 2d 471

(8th Cir. 1979) ,. the Court held that where eyewitness
·identification was the sole basis for conviction, it
was reversible error for the trial court not to give
a cautionary instruction alerting the jury to the
inherent frailties of eyewitness identification.
The language of this instruction was first
drafted by the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia in United States v. Telfaire,,c469 F. 2d 552
at 558-559 (1972).

It was restated in Greene as

follows:
"Identification testimony is an
expression of belief or impression
by the witness.
In this .. case its
value depends on the opportunity
the witness had to observe whether
or not the. defendant was the person
on Trans World Airlines Flight 245
and in Los Angeles and to make a
reliable identification later.
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In appraising the identification
testimony of a witness, you should
consider the following:
1)
Are you convinced that the
witness had the capacity and an
adequate opportunity to observe
the of fender?
Whether the witness had an adequate
opportunity to observe the person
at the time will be affected by such
matters as how long or short a time
was available, how far or close the
witness was, how good were lighting
conditions, whether the witness had
had occasion to see or know the
person in the past.
2)
Are you satisfied that the
identification made by the witness
subsequent to the event was the
product of his or her own
recollection?
You may take into account both the
strength of the identification, and
the circumstances under which the
identification was made.
If the
identification by the witness may
have been influenced by the
circumstances under which the
defendant was presented to him for
identification, you should scrutinize
the identification with great care.
You may also consider the length of
time that lapsed between the occurrence
of the crime and the next opportunity
of the witness to see defendant, as a
factor bearing on the reliability of
the identification.
3)
Finally, you must consider the
credibility of each identification
witness in the same way as any other
witness, consider whether he is
truthful, and consider whether he
had the capacity and opportunity to
make a reliable observation on the
matter covered in his testimony.
I again emphasize that the burden of
proof on the prosecutor extends to
every element of the crime charged,
and this specifically includes the
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burden of proving beyond a reasonable
doubt the identity of the defendant
as being the person on Trans World
Airlines Flight 245 and being in
Los Angeles.
If after examining the
testimony, you have a reasonable
doubt to the accuracy of the
identification, you must find in
favor of the defendant on this issue'~
at 474, footnote 4.
The instruction has subsequently been approved
in United States v. Holley, 502 F. 2d 273 (4th Cir.
1974) and United States v. Hodges, 515 F. 2d 650
(7th Cir. 1975).

State courts have also approved

the instruction in principle or slightly altered
form.

Brook v. State, 380 So. 2d 1012 at 1014

(Ala. 1980)

Freeman v. State, 371 So. 2d 118

(Fla. 1979)

Corrunonwealth v. Rodriguez, 391 N.E.

2d 892 (Mass. 1979); and in a concurring opinion
in Hampton v. State, 285 N.W. 2d 868 at 875 (Wis. 1979).
Since the sole basis for conviction of this
defendant rested upon questionable identification
procedures previously explained, it was imperative
to give the Telfaire charge.
Other states which have considered the
instruction but refused to require it have said the
essence of the instruction was given in other
instructions of the Court, particularly the
instruction on credibility of witnesses.
This standard cannot be· applied in defendant's
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case.

Judge Gould read the first eleven instructions

to the jury at the start of the trial, but did not
reread them at the conclusion of the three-day trial.
These preliminary instructions included the instructions
on presumption of innocence and on judging the
credibility of witnesses.
This practice prejudiced the defendant because
important instructions were not given to the jury at
the close of the case and, therefore, not fresh in
their minds.
POINT THIRTEEN
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL WAS FURTHER
DEMONSTRATED BY FAILING TO ATTEMPT INTRODUCTION
OF DEFENDANT'S POLYGRAPH RESULT.S.
The defendant passed a polygraph test administered
by Dr. David Raskin.

Admittedly, he had failed a

polygraph earlier administered by police under
questionable circumstances.

(Suppression Hearing 43)

Defense counsel made no attempt at trial to have the
results admitted despite Dr. Raskin's previously
recognized qualifications.
P.

2d 775,

State v. Collins, 612

778 (1980).

In Collins, this Court stated that it would
consider the admissibility of an unstipulated
polygraph provided it had the benefit of an adequate
evidentiary record, at 778.

Qualified defense counsel
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should have been aware of the foundational
requirements cited in Collins and made the
appropriate attempt at trial.
CONCLUSION
A motion for new trial as provided for in
Rule 24, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, requires
only a showing of error or improprieties which had
a substantial adverse effect on the defendant.

Any

of these points may well have satisfied that burden.
The accumulated effect is overwhelming.
DATED this 13th day of May, 1981.
Respectfully submitted,

BRIAN R. FLORENCE
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
818-26th Street
Ogden, UT 84401

1, HN BLAIR HUTCHISON
/ ttorney for Defendant-Appellant
818-26th Street
Ogden, UT
84401
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